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This paper analyzes a procurement setting with two identical ﬁrms and stochastic
innovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who
cannot charge entry fees may prefer a ﬁxed-prize tournament to a ﬁrst-price auc-
tion since holding an auction may leave higher rents to ﬁrms when the innovation
technology is subject to large random factors.
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A buyer who wishes to procure an innovative good or service usually cares about the
quality of the innovation, which is affected by suppliers’ investments in R&D. Since
investments and quality are often non-contractible, procurers frequently hold contests
among potential suppliers to induce investments in R&D.1 Two popular contest mech-
anisms are ﬁxed-prize tournaments and ﬁrst-price auctions. In the tournament, the best
innovator receives an ex ante ﬁxed prize. In the auction, the buyer procures the inno-
vation from the ﬁrm that offers the most favorable combination of quality and price.
Both mechanisms prevent opportunistic behavior ex post: The procurer cannot lower
payments to ﬁrms by understating quality, and ﬁrms do not beneﬁt from overstating
their costs.
Che and Gale [2003] show that, under a deterministic innovation technology, a
ﬁrst-price auction is optimal within the broad range of contest mechanisms in which
only the winner receives a prize. In particular, the auction always outperforms a ﬁxed-
prize tournament. Fullerton et al. [2002] compare ﬁrst-price auctions and ﬁxed prizes
in a stochastic environment. They also ﬁnd that the auction generally leads to lower
costs for the buyer.
In contrast, however, we often observe ﬁxed-prize tournaments in R&D settings. A
prominent historic example is the 1829 contest where Liverpool and Manchester Rail-
way announced a prize of $500 for the best performing engine for the ﬁrst passenger
line between two British cities (Fullerton and McAfee [1999]). Currently, the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the U.S. Department of Defense
sponsors the "Grand Challenge 2005" to promote R&D in autonomous ground vehicle
technology. A prize of $2 millon will be awarded to the team whose vehicle completes
1Seminalpapersoninnovationcontestsinclude, e.g., Taylor[1995], Fullertonetal. [1999], Fullerton
and McAfee [1999].
2a certain route within a speciﬁed time (DARPA [2005]). In the private sector, the In-
noCentive company provides an online forum where "seeker companies" post R&D
challenges in chemistry or biology for which scientists then submit solutions. The best
solution is rewarded by a prespeciﬁed prize (InnoCentive [2005]).2
The purpose of this paper is to provide a possible answer to the question of when a
buyer may prefer a ﬁxed-prize tournament to a ﬁrst-price auction. To do so, I consider
a two-ﬁrm setting where ﬁrms have the same stochastic innovation technology and
are liquidity constrained, so that the buyer cannot charge entry fees. Before a ﬁrm
bids a price, it observes not only the quality of its own innovation but also the one of
the other ﬁrm.3 This assumption is a signiﬁcant departure from Che and Gale [2003]
and Fullerton et al. [2002]. It is not essential for the results, but greatly simpliﬁes
the analysis. In section 5, I brieﬂy discuss the case in which the quality of a ﬁrms’
innovation is observed only by this ﬁrm and the buyer.
In the auction, if ﬁrms’ innovations differ signiﬁcantly, the high-quality ﬁrm can
demand a much higher price than the low-quality ﬁrm. Therefore, assuming that the
buyercannotchargeentryfees, ﬁrmsmayearnhigherrentsunderanauctionthanunder
a prespeciﬁed ﬁxed prize. As a result, the buyer prefers a ﬁxed-prize tournament to
an auction when the innovation technology is subject to large random factors, so that
ﬁrms are likely to realize quite different innovations.
"Randomness" is measured in terms of conditional stochastic dominance (CSD).4
Formally, the buyer preannounces a ﬁxed prize if the cumulative distribution function
(cdf) of the quality difference is dominated by an exponential distribution. Another,
2For further examples of ﬁxed-prize tournaments, see, e.g., Windham [1999], Che and Gale [2003],
or Maurer and Scotchmer [2004].
3For example, this is the case if submitting innovations involves testing prototypes (e.g., of a military
plane), and employees of both ﬁrms are present when prototypes are tested.
4The concept of CSD is common in the literature on ﬁrst-price auctions. See, e.g., Lebrun [1998],
Maskin and Riley [2000], or Arozamena and Cantillon [2004].
3stronger, sufﬁcient condition for the optimality of a ﬁxed prize is the log-convexity of
the cdf. In contrast, if the cdf is log-concave, an auction without a minimum price is
optimal.
The latter point is useful to understand why my ﬁndings do not contradict Fullerton
et al. [2002], who also analyze a stochastic environment in the absence of entry fees
but ﬁnd that the auction generally dominates. However, they consider a special class
of log-concave cdfs. The main difference between my paper and Che and Gale [2003]
is that, in their framework, identical ﬁrms never earn rents because their deterministic
innovation technology implies a mixed-strategy equilibrium and thus complete rent
dissipation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the model is
introduced. Section 3 analyzes the bidding and investment stage. In section 4, the
buyer’s optimization problem is solved. The last section concludes.
2 The model
A buyer holds a contest to procure an innovation from one of two ex ante identical
ﬁrms. All parties are risk-neutral and the buyer cannot charge entry fees. Firm i,
i 2 f1;2g, receives an innovation of quality
qi = xi + ¹i (1)
if it invests c(xi) + ¹ c, where xi;¹ c ¸ 0, and ¹i is a random variable. I call xi ﬁrm
i’s investment strategy. I assume that c(xi) is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and
twice differentiable for all xi > 0. Furthermore, c(0) = 0, limxi!+0 c0(xi) = 0, and
4infxi¸0 c00(xi) > 0.5 If a ﬁrm decides to participate in the contest, it must at least invest
¹ c to be able to submit an innovation. Thus, ¹ c captures all ﬁxed and opportunity costs
from contest participation.
The random variables ¹1 and ¹2 are identically and independently distributed. Ad-
ditionally,
E[maxf¹1;¹2g] ¡ 2¹ c ¸ ¹ u; (2)
where ¹ u 2 R denotes the buyer’s utility if she does not procure the innovation. This
assumption guarantees that the buyer ex ante beneﬁts from holding the contest.6
Since the difference between the qualities of ﬁrms’ innovations will be crucial, I
deﬁne the random variable ´ := ¹2 ¡ ¹1 with cdf G(´) and density g(´). Because
¹1 and ¹2 are identically distributed, g(´) is symmetric around zero. Let S denote
the support of g. I assume that G(´) is continuous on R and both G(´) and g(´) are
differentiable on the interior of S.7 Furthermore, let g(´) have a local maximum at
´ = 0.
A ﬁrm’s investment strategy and investment costs are non-observable. Both qual-
ities q1;q2 are observed by the buyer and the ﬁrms. However, qualities are non-
veriﬁable. Third parties can only verify payments to ﬁrms, whether a ﬁrm submitted
an innovation, and from which ﬁrm the buyer procured the innovation.
Timing is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, the buyer speciﬁes a ﬁxed payment f ¸ 0
to each ﬁrm submitting an innovation. Additionally, she commits to procuring one of
the submitted innovations, where the winning ﬁrm receives at least a minimum price
of p ¸ 0 and at most a maximum price of p ¸ p. In the second stage, ﬁrms choose
5As will be shown in section 3, the last assumption is required to guarantee the existence of a pure
strategy equilibrium in the investment stage.
6The buyer can always implement xi = 0 if she commits to paying ¹ c to each ﬁrm that submits an
innovation (assuming that the submission of an innovation is veriﬁable).
7For many distributions of ¹i (e.g., the uniform distribution), g is not differentiable at zero, which
does, however, not affect the results.
5their investment strategies x1;x2. Afterwards, random variables ¹1;¹2 are realized,
ﬁrms submit their innovations, and qualities q1;q2 are observed.8 In the last stage,
the bidding takes place. Firms announce prices p1 and p2, respectively, such that p ·
p1; p2 · p. Firm i wins if it offers the higher surplus to the buyer, i.e., if qi ¡ pi >
qj ¡ pj. In this case, ﬁrm i receives pi + f, and ﬁrm j receives f. If surpluses are
identical, the winner is chosen by ﬂipping a fair coin.
Observe that the mechanism nests both ﬁxed-prize tournaments and ﬁrst-price auc-
tions. Speciﬁcally, if the buyer chooses p = p, the mechanism amounts to a ﬁxed-prize
tournament where the prize is awarded to the ﬁrm with the higher quality. In contrast,
with p = 0 and p = 1, the mechanism is a ﬁrst-price auction without a minimum or
maximum allowable price.
3 Firms’ decisions
The game is solved by backwards induction. In the last stage, when bidding occurs,
all parties involved know q1 and q2. Suppose that qi > qj. Then, ﬁrm j bids pj = p,





p + (qi ¡ qj) if qi ¡ qj · ¢
p + ¢ if qi ¡ qj > ¢
; (3)
where ¢ := p¡p, and qi¡qj reﬂects the increase in the buyer’s surplus if she procures
the innovation from the high-quality ﬁrm.
Thus, the ﬁrm with the higher quality wins the bidding. It receives the minimum
price p plus a quality premium which is bounded above by ¢ and equals jq1 ¡ q2j if
8Alternatively, all parties involved could observe non-veriﬁable quality signals si = qi + ²i, where
²i is some noise occurring when quality is measured.
6jq1¡q2j · ¢. Giveninvestmentstrategiesx1 andx2, wehavethatq1¡q2 = x1¡x2¡´.
Consequently, the payment that ﬁrm 1 receives in the last stage of the game in addition
to f is:
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
0 if x1 ¡ x2 < ´
1
2p if x1 ¡ x2 = ´
p + x1 ¡ x2 ¡ ´ if x1 ¡ x2 ¡ ¢ · ´ < x1 ¡ x2
p + ¢ if ´ < x1 ¡ x2 ¡ ¢
(4)
Analogously, ﬁrm 2 obtains:
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
0 if ´ < x1 ¡ x2
1
2p if x1 ¡ x2 = ´
p + x2 ¡ x1 + ´ if x1 ¡ x2 < ´ · x1 ¡ x2 + ¢
p + ¢ if x1 ¡ x2 + ¢ < ´
(5)
In the investment stage, each ﬁrm chooses its investment strategy to maximize its
expected payment in the auction net of investment costs. Given that ﬁrm 2 adopts
investment strategy x2, ﬁrm 1 chooses x1 to maximize
Z x1¡x2
x1¡x2¡¢
(p + x1 ¡ x2 ¡ ´)g(´)d´ +
Z x1¡x2¡¢
¡1
(p + ¢)g(´)d´ ¡ c(x1): (6)
Given x1, ﬁrm 2 maximizes
Z x1¡x2+¢
x1¡x2
(p + x2 ¡ x1 + ´)g(´)d´ +
Z 1
x1¡x2+¢
(p + ¢)g(´)d´ ¡ c(x2): (7)



































For the purpose of this paper and given that ﬁrms are identical, I only consider
symmetric pure-strategy Nash-equilibria xN
1 = xN
2 =: x. Symmetry of g(´) implies
that G(¡¢) = 1 ¡ G(¢) and G(0) = 1









Starting from identical investment strategies, the left-hand side of (10) gives a
ﬁrm’s marginal beneﬁt from increasing investments. The term pg(0) indicates the
higher probability of winning the bidding and obtaining at least p. The term in square
brackets represents the increase in the expected quality premium that the winning ﬁrm
receives in addition to p.
Naturally, high values of p and ¢ provide strong investment incentives. Further-
more, investments increase in g(0) and, given ¢, in G(¢). A large g(0) indicates that
the probability of winning responds strongly to changes in investments. A large G(¢)
reﬂects that the quality premium is likely to equal the difference between qualities (in-
stead of ¢). Both implies that the outcome of the mechanism is relatively sensitive to
changes in investments.
Firms’ objective functions (6) and (7) are not necessarily concave, so that we need
further assumptions to ensure that x as given by (10) is indeed a pure-strategy equilib-









i.e., random inﬂuences are sufﬁciently signiﬁcant (g is sufﬁciently "ﬂat").
Because g(´) is symmetric around zero, this condition also guarantees strict con-
cavity of (7) in x2 (given an arbitrary x1). Since condition (11) should be satisﬁed for
all p that the buyer might choose, we need to specify an upper bound on p. It can be
shown that the buyer never wants to implement an x that is larger than the socially
optimal investment level (given that two ﬁrms invest), denoted x¤,
x
¤ := argmaxx x + E[maxf¹1;¹2g] ¡ 2(c(x) + ¹ c): (12)













That is, I restrict attention to the class of problems for which the exogenously given
functions g(´) and c(x) are such that a ﬁrm’s objective function is concave for all p
and ¢ that the buyer might choose.10
9intS denotes the interior of S.
10Usually, this is the case if var(´) = 2var(¹i) is large enough. For example, if ¹i is uniformly









u2 if 0 < ´ · u ;
so that (13) is equivalent to 3=(2u) < D.
94 The buyer’s problem
I now analyze the ﬁrst stage in which the buyer speciﬁes f;p; and ¢. By (10), each
ﬁrm chooses the efﬁcient investment strategy x¤ if the buyer holds a ﬁrst-price auction
without minimum and maximum price (p = 0, p = 1).11 However, as ﬁrms may earn
rents, this choice of p and p will in general not be optimal from the buyer’s point of
view.
Instead of maximizing the buyer’s expected surplus, I consider the problem of
minimizing her expected costs for implementing a given investment strategy x. This
greatly simpliﬁes the analysis. Moreover, for the purpose of this paper, since the sufﬁ-
cient conditions for the optimality of a ﬁxed-prize tournament will not depend on x, it
is also not necessary to determine the surplus-maximizing investment strategy.




p + j´j if j´j · ¢
p + ¢ otherwise
: (14)
Let ¹ G denote the cdf of j´j and ¹ g the corresponding density function.12 Then, the
expected price before observing qualities is
P(p;¢) := p +
Z ¢
0
y¹ g(y)dy + (1 ¡ ¹ G(¢))¢: (15)
11This mechanism maximizes the buyer’s expected surplus in Che and Gale [2003] when ﬁrms are
identical.
12It is easily veriﬁed that ¹ G(y) = 2G(y) ¡ 1 for all y ¸ 0. Also note that j´j = ¹(2) ¡ ¹(1), where
¹(2);¹(1) denote the ﬁrst- and second-order statistic of the the sample ¹1;¹2.
10This leads to the following optimization problem for the buyer:
C(x) := min
f;p;¢












P(p;¢) ¡ c(x) ¸ ¹ c (18)
f;p;¢ ¸ 0 (19)
Equation (17) is the incentive compatibility constraint, inequality (18) is a ﬁrm’s
participation constraint, and (19) are the non-negativity constraints. By eliminating p
using (17) and observing that the buyer will choose the smallest non-negative f that






2(c(x) + ¹ c); ^ P(¢;x)
oi














y¹ g(y)dy + (1 ¡ ¹ G(¢))¢: (21)
^ P(¢;x) is the expected price that the buyer has to pay depending on her choice of
¢ and given x. The buyer minimizes her expected costs by choosing ¢ to minimize
^ P(¢;x). Let ¢¤(x) denote an optimal choice of ¢ given x. Then, two cases can be
distinguished. If 2(c(x) + ¹ c) > ^ P(¢¤;x), the expected price in the auction is smaller
than ﬁrms’ investment and opportunity costs. Thus, f must be positive to make ﬁrms
participate in the contest. The buyer chooses f such that ﬁrms are just compensated
for their costs, i.e., ﬁrms’ participation constraints are binding.13 On the other hand, if
13Actually, in this case, the buyer is indifferent between all ¢ for which 2(c(x)+ ¹ c) > ^ P(¢;x), i.e.,
112(c(x) + ¹ c) · ^ P(¢¤;x), ﬁxed payments are zero and ﬁrms earn (ex ante) rents.
Implementing a ﬁxed-prize tournament (¢¤(x) = 0) is optimal if ^ P(¢;x) in-






+ [1 ¡ ¹ G(¢)] ¸ 0 for all ¢ ¸ 0: (22)
Increasing ¢ while holding x constant has two effects. First, the minimum price
p decreases (given by ¡
¹ g(¢)
¹ g(0) ). Second, the expected quality premium that the winning
ﬁrm receives in addition to p increases (given by [1¡ ¹ G(¢)]). The second effect always
dominates the ﬁrst one if
¸ ¹ G(¢) :=
¹ g(¢)
1 ¡ ¹ G(¢)
· ¹ g(0) for all ¢ ¸ 0: (23)
Consequently, ¢¤(x) = 0 for all x if the hazard rate of ¹ G, ¸ ¹ G(¢), is sufﬁciently
small. If, on the other hand, ^ P(¢;x) strictly decreases in ¢ over some interval (0;a],
a > 0, the buyer should not use a ﬁxed-prize scheme. The optimal minimum and
maximum price then depends on ¹ G and x.14 However, if ^ P(¢;x) always decreases in
¢, i.e.,
¸ ¹ G(¢) ¸ ¹ g(0) for all ¢ ¸ 0; (24)
thebuyerminimizesexpectedprocurementcostsbysettingp = 0and¢ = ¹ G¡1(2c0(x)).
Thatis, thebuyerusesanauctionwithoutaminimumpriceandsetsthemaximumprice
so that ﬁrms invest x.
Applying the concept of conditional stochastic dominance (CSD), we can now dis-
tinguish distributions of j´j with respect to the optimality of a ﬁxed-prize tournament
minimizing ^ P(¢;x) is sufﬁcient but not necessary for minimizing procurement costs.
14In particular, since ^ P(¢;x) is in general not convex in ¢, the ﬁrst-order condition for minimizing
^ P(¢;x) is not sufﬁcient to characterize ¢¤(x).
12or an auction with p = 0.
Deﬁnition 1 Consider two cdfs ¹ G1 and ¹ G2. ¹ G1 dominates ¹ G2 in terms of conditional
stochastic dominance, denoted ¹ G1 º ¹ G2, if
¸ ¹ G1(y) ¸ ¸ ¹ G2(y)
for all y for which ¸ ¹ G1(y) and ¸ ¹ G2(y) are well deﬁned.
This means that, conditional on any maximum quality premium ¢, this maximum
quality premium is more likely to be paid under ¹ G2 than under ¹ G1. It also implies that
¹ G1(y) ¸ ¹ G2(y) for all y, i.e., ¹ G1 ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates ¹ G2.15
Inequality (23) is binding at ¢ = 0 for every distribution of j´j. Furthermore, if
j´j is exponentially distributed, we have ¸ ¹ G(¢) = ¹ g(0) for all ¢ ¸ 0 so that (23) is
always binding. Therefore, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let H(y) := 1 ¡ exp[¡¹ g(0)y].
(i) If H º ¹ G, then the buyer uses a ﬁxed-prize tournament.
(ii) If ¹ G º H, then the buyer uses an auction with p = 0.
Thus, if it is possible to rank ¹ G in terms of CSD relatively to an exponential distri-
bution with the same marginal probability of having the higher quality under identical
investments (H0(0) = ¹ G0(0)), the optimal procurement mechanism is either a ﬁxed-
prize tournament or an auction with minimum price zero. This holds independently of
the investment strategy x the buyer wants to implement. In the special case of ¹ G = H,
all combinations of p and ¢ that implement x lead to the same expected costs for the
buyer.
15See, e.g., Krishna [2002], p. 260.
13The intuition of proposition 1 is as follows. If H º ¹ G, the realization of j´j
is likely to be relatively large, i.e., the values of the innovations for the buyer will
probably differ greatly. As a result, in an auction, the high-quality ﬁrm can demand a
large quality premium, i.e., the buyer is likely to pay p+¢. Setting incentives through
an auction is then too expensive from the buyer’s point of view since it leaves higher
rents to ﬁrms than a ﬁxed prize.
The concept of CSD allows to capture the intuition for the superiority of a ﬁxed-
prize tournament under certain probability distributions. However, we do not know
yet which of the common distributions (e.g, normal or uniform distribution) favor an
auction or a ﬁxed-prize scheme. To answer this question, note that the optimality
condition for a tournament, inequality (23), holds if ¸ ¹ G(y) is monotone decreasing. By
contrast, a monotone increasing ¸ ¹ G(y) (i.e., inequality (24) holds) favors an auction
with minimum price zero. Monotonicity of ¸ ¹ G turns out to be equivalent to the log-
concavity or log-convexity of G on S \ R¡.
Deﬁnition 2 A function F : R ! (0;1) is log-concave on the interval (a;b) µ R if
the function lnF is concave on (a;b) and log-convex if lnF is convex on (a;b).
Thus, G is log-convex (log-concave) on a certain interval if and only if g(y)=G(y)
is increasing (decreasing) on this interval. For y ¸ 0, we have that
¸ ¹ G(y) =
¹ g(y)








which implies that ¸ ¹ G is monotone decreasing (increasing) if and only if G is log-
convex (log-concave) on S \ R¡. This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (i) If G is log-convex on S \ R¡, then the buyer uses a ﬁxed-prize
tournament.
14(ii) If G is log-concave on S \ R¡, then the buyer uses an auction with p = 0.
As is well known from the literature, most "named" distributions are log-concave
(see, e.g., An [1998] or Bagnoli and Bergstrom [2005]). However, cdfs that exhibit






2(1¡y) y · 0
1 ¡ 1
2(1+y) y > 0
(26)
is log-convex on R¡ so that, under this distribution function, a ﬁxed-prize tournament
dominates an auction.16
Log-convexity of G, or, equivalently, a decreasing ¸ ¹ G means that the instantaneous
probability that a certain quality difference j´j is realized, given that the quality differ-
ence is at least j´j, decreases in j´j. This is a strong requirement. However, by (23), it
is sufﬁcient (and necessary) for a tournament to be superior that ¸ ¹ G(y) decreases for
small y, while it may increase for relatively large y as long as it does not exceed ¸ ¹ G(0).
Intuitively, ¸ ¹ G(y) decreases for small y if it becomes more likely that ﬁrms’ innova-
tions differ relatively strongly, given that they have not found very similar innovations.
This may be the case if the innovation technology is subject to large random factors.
5 Discussion and conclusion
This paper shows that a ﬁxed-prize tournament can dominate a ﬁrst-price auction in
procurement settings. The key point leading to this result is that, under stochastic
innovations and in the absence of entry fees, holding an auction may leave higher rents
to ﬁrms than announcing a ﬁxed prize. The technical results on CSD and log-convexity
16It is easily veriﬁed that, for this distribution function, condition (13) holds if 1:5 < infx c00(x). In
general, log-concavity or log-convexity of the distribution function does not contradict (13).
15versus log-concavity, however, are presumably particular to the way the stochastic
innovation technology is modelled, namely, that an increase in a ﬁrm’s investment
shifts its cdf of quality to the right.
For simplicity, I considered a two-ﬁrm setting. The extension to the case of n
identical ﬁrms is straightforward. With n ﬁrms, the quality premium in the auction is
the difference between the two highest order statistics, ¹(n) ¡ ¹(n¡1), of the sample
¹1;:::;¹n. Then, the hazard rate of the cdf of ¹(n) ¡ ¹(n¡1) is crucial for making the
right choice between auction and tournament.17
Furthermore, I assumed that all parties involved observe qualities before the bid-
ding process. If instead only the buyer and ﬁrm i observes qi, ﬁrm i bids qi¡E[qjjqj <
qi] in a ﬁrst-price auction without any minimum or maximum price (compare Fullerton
et al. [2002]). It can be shown that this leads to the same investments and expected
costs for the buyer as in the case analyzed above. Although optimal bidding strategies
change, parties’ expected payoffs in the stages before qualities are observed remain
the same. With a ﬁxed prize, it does not matter whether a ﬁrm can observe the quality
that the other contestant can supply. Therefore, the buyer still prefers a ﬁxed prize if
the expected price in the auction, ¹(2) ¡ ¹(1), is so high that ﬁrms earn large rents.
It is often argued that holding an auction (without a minimum or maximum price)
has a substantial advantage over announcing a ﬁxed-prize tournament since the latter
requires more knowledge on the side of the buyer. To calculate an appropriate ﬁxed
prize, the buyer has to know ﬁrms’ costs and innovation technologies. In this paper,
if the buyer conducts an auction without restricting the set of allowable prices, ﬁrms
even choose efﬁcient investments. However, this is often not optimal from the buyer’s
point of view. Then, in the auction, the buyer also needs detailed knowledge on invest-
17The decision on the optimal number of contest participants is non-trivial. Holding investments
constant, moreparticipantsleadtoahigherexpectedquality, whiletheeffectonthebuyer’scostfunction
depends heavily on the underlying probability distribution.
16ment costs and innovation technologies to calculate the appropriate maximum and/or
minimum price. Therefore, as soon as the buyer wishes to direct ﬁrms’ investment
behavior, the informational advantage of the auction disappears.
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